POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN THE USSR AND JAPAN: A TENTATIVE COMPARISON*

Shugo Minagawa

One might expect the conduct of bureaucracies of modern industrial countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union to be governed by the norms of rationality, anonimity, and universalism. Insecurity, which is believed to be one of the causes of clientelism, is not greatly felt by the officials of these countries who in a material sense enjoy considerable privileges at least while they are in office (although one must admit that in the USSR officials until recently were highly insecure since it was easy to be deprived of office). Yet, it has been widely noted that informal alignments based on interpersonal commitments are one of the characteristics of both the Japanese and the Soviet bureaucracies.

This paper seeks to establish a few common and distinctive features of the 'physiology' of Soviet and Japanese political clientelism. That is to say, it attempts to identify the reasons for the development of clientelism, how it works and what part it plays in the operation of the system as a whole. One of the limitations of comparable studies of clientelism in this paper is that the overall political systems within which clientelism operates in the two countries differ greatly. Largely because of this, I propose to limit my consideration of Japanese clientelism mainly to the government bureaucracy, that part of the Japanese

* This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies (30 September-4 Octoder, 1980, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, West Germany).

system presenting the broadest basis of comparison with the Soviet system as a whole.

Since the audience to which this paper is primarily addressed will generally have some familiarity with case material illustrative of political clientelism in the USSR, but be less familiar with comparable phenomena in Japan, it will be useful, in order to provide some basis for comparison, to look closely at a particular Japanese case. This appears to be entirely typical, albeit an unusually well-documented one. The story makes for rather complicated reading, but it is well to remind ourselves that clientelist politics is often very complicated, and it has the merit of illustrating in a concrete way most of the general features of Japanese clientelist behaviour to be discussed later. For a quick first reading of the paper, the reader may prefer to proceed direct to page 279, where the general analysis commences.

I JAPANESE CASE

This case concerns 'S' (Shigeru SAHASHI) who served in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) from April 1937 to April 1967. He started his career in the Engineering Bureau, then advanced by moving around a number of bureaus (the so-called 'spiral advancement'): General Affairs Bureau, Textile Bureau, Sendai Local Office, Coal Industry Bureau, Secretariat, Heavy Industry Bureau, Enterprise Bureau, and the Patent Agency. He retired as (administrative) Vice-Minister of MITI - the highest civil service post in the Ministry - in April 1967.

'S' 's early career had suffered many twists and turns because of his uncompromising personality. When he was the Chief of the Paper Industry Section in Textile Bureau, the Ministry's employees union,[1] which was headed by 'S', was suppressed by the Director of the Secretariat, NAGAYAMA. 'S' had clashed over union issues with NAGAYAMA several times. 'S' was eventually demoted by NAGAYAMA and transferred to the Sendai Local Office of the Ministry. His clientelist activities had really started when he became Chief of the Personnel

Section in the Secretariat in July 1954. He served in this office for two terms, till July 1957. There are three sections in the Secretariat: the Personnel (literally secretarial activities), General Affairs, and Accounting sections. Those heading the Personnel Section and the General Affairs Section, in particular, enjoyed the highest status of all incumbents of the 200 or so posts at section-chief level in MITI (including its extra-ministerial offices), and so had better chances of becoming bureau chiefs. (There are seven Bureaus and three extra-ministerial Bureaus, and the Director of Secretariat also has Bureau Chief rank. Again, as in the case of section chiefs, not all bureau chiefs have equal status. The Chief of the Enterprise Bureau, for example, had better chances to become Vice Minister for the Ministry.) The main areas of responsibility of the General Affairs Section is to work out programmes for the general management and policy coordination of the Ministry. The Personnel Section is responsible for such matters as recruitment, dismissal, advancement, marriage arrangements, post-retirement jobs, etc. The three sections in the Secretariat operate under the direction of a Director. As the Secretariat deals with confidential matters of the Ministry, such as policy adjustments, personnel matters and the Ministry's budget, the Vice-Minister chooses his right-hand man as its Director. Likewise, the latter usually appoints his trusted followers as its section chiefs. The Vice-Minister was at that time ISHIHARA, and the Director of the Secretariat was MATSUO. The Chief of the General Affairs Section in the Secretariat was 'I' (Zenei IMAI) who had been 'S' 's chief rival right through his career in the Ministry, although they shared the same patron.

The Chief of the Personnel Section can by no means act solely on his own initiative, although he is assigned to implement the Ministry's day-to-day personnel policy. Probably, he has greater latitude to act on personnel changes below the section-chief level. Above that level, however, he is more likely to receive instructions from the Director of the Secretariat, the latter having sought the opinion of the Vice-Minister or the 'Tuesday Club' (formed by retired high-level officials

of MITI). But if the section chief happens to have an uncompromising personality and a vision of future personnel policy such as 'S' had, and provided the Director gives him his blessing, the section chief can occupy a pivotal position in personnel management.

It should be noted that about the year 1954, the Japanese economy passed from the period of post-war recovery to that of expansion. The first postwar prosperity period started in 1955. Ever since Japan was admitted into the I.M.F. and the world Bank in 1952, the Japanese government had been under constant pressure to become an I.M.F. Article Eight Country, i. e. to establish an open economic system like those of other developed countries. 'S' appears to have been seriously concerned about the competitiveness of Japanese industries in an open economic system, and therefore worked out a personnel policy to cope with this contingency. He succeeded in recruiting 19 very able graduates out of 200 successful candidates whom he interviewed personally. 'S' also took note of the intellectual ability of 'Z' (Yoshihiko MOROZUMI-recruited in 1943) who then held the position of research counsellor in the Secretariat. 'Z' had a high reputation in the Ministry for his outstanding logical mind. In order to facilitate 'Z' 's objective of studying the French system of mixed economy, 'S' sent him to Paris, where he was attached to the Japanese Embassy as a trade attaché. 'S' had also established very close personal bonds with 'C' (Chihaya KAWADE-recruited in 1939), 'H' (Hideyuki KAWAHARA-recruited in 1941) and 'Y' (Yukio MIYAKE recruited in 1943). 'C' was at that time the Chief of the First Section of the Enterprise Bureau, and 'Y' the Chief of its Second Section. The post of first section chief, whose future career prospects are usually bright, is usually given to one of those promising officials whose creative minds are tested and in constant demand in the Ministry. 'H' was then the Minister's secretary in the Secretariat. 'C', 'H' and 'Y' all, if not 'Z', shared the same temperament and aspirations as their patron, 'S'.

When 'S' was promoted to be Deputy Chief and later Chief of the Heauy Industry Bureau, 'C' succeeded to 'S' 's previous post, as Chief

of the Personnel Section in the Secretariat, and a little later 'C' became 'S' 's deputy in the Heavy Industry Bureau, while 'Y' became the Minister's secretary in the Secretariat.

When 'S' became the Chief of the Enterprise Bureau, he succeeded in placing his key followers in strategic positions so as to mobilize them to his own ends. 'H' became the counsellor of the planning section in the Secretariat, and 'O' (Kenzo OTOTAKE-recruited in 1941, another of 'S' 's loyal followers) became the Chief of General Affairs Section in the Secretariat. 'Z' was hastily recalled from Paris to head the First Section of the Enterprise Bureau, which position had been kept vacant by 'S' for two months - a very unusual occurrence in Japanese governmental personnel management. 'Y' was also chosen to head the Industrial Funds Section in the Enterprise Bureau. 'S' 's clientelist machine, who became known as the 'Nationalists', moved in full swing to materialize their patron's policy object: to reinforce domestic industries in anticipation of the impending change in Japan's economic situation.

'S' 's clientelist machine made such determined efforts in the Ministry that a countermove by the so-called 'Internationalists' was made. The internationalist group was gradually formed around 'I' (the Chief of the International Trade Bureau) who made his career largely in the field of international trade. It is said that their countermove was promoted not so much by the policy issue, as by 'S' 's uncompromising personality and his obvious clientelist activities. The 'Internationalists', moved carefully, however, to counterbalance 'S' 's weight in the Ministry. 'S' had to concede to one of 'I' 's followers, 'J' (Yoshihisa OJIMI-recruited in 1941), though unlike 'I' whose career had largely been made in the field of domestic industry but still shared the same temperament as 'I'. 'J' was to head the newly created research section on the restructuring of industry in the Secretariat. This section had to enquire into which of the country's industries would be reinforced by law. Such an enquiry could be expected to contribute significantly in the process of drafting and realizing any related legislation.

The Ministry duly drafted a bill on 'Temporary Measures for the

Promotion of Specified Industries'. It was originally drafted by two junior officials (KONAGA and UCHIDA - both of them 'S' 's followers) in the Heavy Industry Bureau. This initial draft was designed to support those weak industries based on classified-industry. When 'Z' came back from Paris, however, he revised it by introducing a more systematic approach, that is, by linking weak industries laterally so that all weak industries could be reinforced in a harmonious and synchronized way. The bill went before the Diet for approval three times, and although certain amendments were made each time, it was never passed. Needless to say 'S' and his followers in the Ministry mobilized all available forces including their social networks in order to influence interested parties, such as the Fair Trade Commission and in particular financial and industrial circles. But to no avail, they turned it down. Moreover, the ruling party had shown very little enthusiasm. It was a bill without political sponsors.

'S' aggrieved at the failure of his efforts, placed the responsibility partly on the Minister's (then Hajime FUKUDA- Ohno faction, LDP) lukewarm support for the bill. Unfortunately, for him this was just the time when the new Vice-Minister was to be named as successor to the retiring Vice-Minister, MATSUO. In MITI, it was almost taken for granted that the Chief of the Enterprise Bureau (now 'S') would succeed the retiring Vice-Minister. Despite repeated warnings from MATSUO, however, the Minister ignored all precedents, and named 'S' 's chief rival 'I' as successor to the retiring MATSUO. We do not know whether the 'Internationalists' engaged in any campaign behind the scenes against the bill and against 'S' personally. 'S' was now demoted to the post of Director of the Patent Agency, an extra-ministerial office of MITI. Presumably, the Minister decided on his demotion for two reasons: 'S' 's open criticism of himself and his unconventional behaviour in not reciprocating favours.[2] Although 'S' was removed from the centre of power in the Ministry, some of his followers were able to control the nerve system of the Ministry. For instance, 'C' became the Director of the Secretariat, 'H' became the Chief of the Personnel Section and

'Y' became the Chief of the General Affairs Section in the Secretariat.

In the meantime, the former Vice-Ministers, ISHIHARA (retired in 1957, then became Inspector of the Tokyo Electric Power Co.) and TOKUNAGA (retired in 1961, and became Deputy President of the Japan Steel Corporation) in particular, paved the way to reinstate 'S' as Vice-Minister, by apologizing to the Ohno faction for 'S' 's past misbehaviour. When a Cabinet reshuffle took place in October 1964, he was finally made Vice-Minister of the Ministry. 'S' promptly appointed one of his trusted followers, 'H', as Director of the Secretariat. 'C' also became the Chief of the Heavy Industry Bureau, but of the Enterprise Bureau which was the first runner position for becoming the Vice-Minister and which was then occupied by SHIMADA who would have become the Vice-Minister if 'S' had not made a comeback. A year and a half later, however 'S' dramatically decided abruptly to terminate his tenure, out of deep grief at the sudden death of 'H'.

The Minister, MIKI, then had to appoint a successor to 'S' from among three contenders, namely, SHIMADA (Chief of the Enterprise Bureau-recruited in 1939), 'C' ('S' 's follower), and KURAHAHI (Director of the Patent Agency-recruited in 1938; most inopportunely, his secret political maneuvering with the Ohno faction was now revealed). In the end, with a view to restoring harmonious human relations in the Ministry, MIKI decided to appoint a neutral, non-contested man, 'M' (YAMAMOTO-recruited in 1939) as 'S' 's successor. This outcome would scarcely have been anticipated by 'S' who probably had in mind the following line of succession by his trusted followers: he would be succeeded first by 'C' and then by 'H' and eventually by 'Y'. Now that 'C' was out of the competition and 'H' had passed away, such a scenario became irrelevant.

The new Vice-Minister 'M', who succeeded 'S', was not altogether neutral. Much of his career in the Ministry had been associated with the field of international trade. Indeed, at one time, he was the deputy to the then Bureau Chief of the International Trade Bureau, 'I', 'S' 's chief rival. 'M' chose 'J' as his right-hand man, the Director of the

Secretariat. It seems that the reigning Vice-Minister usually has a right to name the Director of the Secretariat. The relations between the Vice-Minister and the Director, however, are usually delicate, complex and sometimes tenuous. If the Vice-Minister does not have a domineering personality, the Director can fully realise his very large formal responsibilities. It is thus a combination of the personality of both, and the degree of trust and affective ties between the two, that determine their relations. In 'J' 's case, he seems to have acted on personnel matters a great deal on his own. He mobilized able officials with long overseas trade experience, offering them important non-international trade posts. For instance, KOMATSU who returned from West Germany was promoted to be Chief of the General Affairs Section in the Secretariat, WADA who returned from Canada became Chief of the Industrial Machine Section in the Heavy Industry Bureau, and MASUDA who returnedd from Belgium became Chief of the Iron and Steel Affairs Section in the Heavy Industry Bureau. By and large, it has been the practice of the Japanese government bureaucracy to produce competent generalists, i. e. officials with experience in varied types of work and in various fields. In MITI, however, there had been a strong tendency for officials who had undergone international trade apprenticeship abroad to be reassigned to comparable policy positions in the central office. Until then, the 'Internationalists' had been regarded as not fit to hold the Vice-Ministership, which should be occupied by a man commanding a profound knowledge in the administration of domestic industries. Indeed, it was 'J' who established firmly the present routinization of the line of succession to the Vice-Ministership: Director of the Secretariat - Chief of the International Trade Policy Bureau (formerly the International Trade Bureau) -- Chief of the Industrial Policy Bureau (formerly the Enterprise Bureau) - Vice-Minister. The routinization not only blurred the distinction between the 'Nationalists' and' Internationalists', but also minimized political interference in the personnel affairs of the Ministry. Previously, there had been a loosely routinized path from the Enterprise Bureau Chief

to the Vice-Minister. But this line of succession was too short, inviting occasional political interference as in the case of 'S'.

It is not certain, however, if the routinization of the line of succession has lessened clientelist activities. The fate of routinization is always susceptible to unforeseen contingencies such as sudden death or ill health or early retirement of the heir apparent, thus leaving room for clientelist manoeuvering. Whether this routinization was devised with intent to suppress the advancement of 'S' 's followers, we do not know. The fact is that none of 'S' 's followers ever found a place in the Vice-Ministership, which has been taken over by the old 'Internationalists'. The possible exception to this is 'Z' who eventually reached the Vice-Ministership. Earlier 'Z' had been the Director of the Secretariat and he was not particularly keen on promoting 'S' 's followers. He may in fact have acted in that way out of a realization that the nature of the contemporary national economic system which was affected by the international economic environment and Japan's growing important place in international trade required structural changes including personnel changes in the government industrial administration. It is said, however, that 'Z', though his professional competence was highly regarded by 'S', had never established close personal bonds with him. Indeed, 'S' was reported to have made the ironical remark some time after his retirement: 'When I happen to meet 'Z' occasionally, he says *ostensibly* I am the one who brought him in to a sunny place' (italics added).[3]

The case cited above is by no means an isolated one in Japanese government bureaucracy. Similar cases have been reported in other Ministries. As mentioned earlier, however, unlike other similar cases, it is well documented by a number of observers.[4] As the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was a little more dynamic than other Ministries, the policy issue also came to the fore at a time of uncertainty of Japan's economic situation and on this, combined with the personality of 'S', a man who did not mince matters, combined to bring the case to the surface, to the good fortune of outside observers.

Ⅱ CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN

Despite the fact that there exist, albeit on a journalistic level, numerous descriptions of Japanese clientelist activities, little attempt has been made to examine such questions as the causation of clientelist behaviour, its system of membership and durability, and the effects of clientelism on the Japanese political system. By contrast, several students of Soviet politics have carried out serious studies aiming to clarify such questions. With reference to the 'physiology' of both Soviet and Japanese political clientelism, however, very few empirical examinations have yet been undertaken. Comparative examination of these aspects must therefore remain a tentative exercise at this present time. More substantial efforts of comparison will only be possible after more extensive empirical findings are available.

1. CAUSATION OF CLIENTELIST BEHAVIOUR

A patron-client relationship is, according to Carl H. Land's definition,[5] 'a vertical dyadic alliance', an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself. It may be almost impossible to pinpoint the exact reasons as to why two individuals form a patron-client relationship; yet with the limited available material on the subject, we may nevertheless roughly divide the individuals' motivations into two categories, which may be termed functional and non-functioal. The manifestations of functional motivation may best be observed in the political process operating in the main areas of clientelist activities, namely, recruitment, advancement, post-retirement security, and policy involvement. It would be a mistake, however, to explain the norms and incentives for clientage relationship in purely functional terms. To approximate an individuals' full motivations, one needs to examine the contexts of clientelism which include also non-fuctional components of a structural, cultural and environ-

mental kind.

Functional Motivation

1) Recruitment and advancement. Speaking of clientelist activity, Keith Legg says,[6] 'nowhere is this clearer than in the area of recruitment and advancement'. Japan and the Soviet Union are no exception to this.

In Japanese government bureaucracy, we saw this in the case history from MITI, where the Chief of the Personnel Section is responsible for recruiting 20 to 30 trainees for higher-level positions every year.[7] The criteria for the recruitment of trainees in Japan is on the whole conservative and formal. The energetic recruiting efforts shown by 'S' when he was Chief of the Personnel Section is somewhat exceptional, although one can certainly point to other cases where persons who have passed the special higher examination decide to enter a Ministry as a result of much persuasion or personal connections. Nonetheless, it is not likely that the trainees establish affective relationships with particular seniors right from the beginning. The recruits often undergo a training period of about six years, learning the work of some particular Ministry. Take the Ministry of Finance, for instance, where the trainees, in their first year, will be dispersed through the planning and research groups of the General Affairs Section in each Bureau or in the Personnel Section or Archives and Documents Section in the Secretariat in order to obtain some basic familiarity with the Ministry. In their second year, the trainees will usually be sent to local revenue offices to learn the actual taxation system on the spot. In their third year, they may take an academic course in economic theory given either at the Ministry or at an academic institution abroad. In their fourth and fifth year, they will be trained under some assistant section chief or full section chief. In the sixth year, as a final training ground, they will be posted to various local revenue offices again, but this time as superintendent. The above-mentioned training period is usually given to all recruits. It helps to

cultivate in the recruits a sense of identity with the Ministry. After this training period, they will ordinarily be shifted from one section to another every two or three years. The main purpose of this spiral career mobility is said to be the ideal of producing generalists rather than specialists, and also to ward off sectionalism.[8]

Almost all recruits reach the position of section chief. By the time a junior becomes a section chief, he will probably have established particularly good relationships with certain senior officials. As we have noted earlier, not all section chiefs enjoy equal status in the Ministry. Hierarchy exists in the Ministry not only vertically but also laterally. Career mobility above assistant section chief is in most cases a matter of moving sideways. The important question is therefore to which post one is assigned, whether it is as section chief or Bureau Chief, given the fact, also, that the line of succession has been routinized in almost all the Ministries. Moreover, senior posts above section chief level are so scarce that their tenure becomes uncertain. As a rule of seniority is strictly applied in career mobility, it follows that if an official remains, without being able to advance himself further, in one position, during a normal rotating period, he then becomes a bottleneck for the juniors who wish to advance their careers. In such a case, he will usually be advised by his senior to retire at an earlier age rather than at the customary retiring age of 55. To avoid such a contingency, an official at section chief level may search for a patron powerful enough to guard his tenure. On the other hand, when an official becomes Bureau Chief, he is so concerned with policy issues that he is in a position to recommend those juniors who are close to him for key positions. We have already observed that when 'S' moved from chief of one bureau to chief of another he took with him some of his men or posted them in strategic positions. It is the Director of the Secretariat, and to a lesser extent the Chief of the Personnel Section, (although his main function is to maintain harmony and solidarity within the Ministry), who is structurally located to establish clientelist relationships with juniors whom he has earmarked during or after the

training period.

The practice of recruiting able juniors as faction members is not a recent phenomenon. In the Imperial Japanese Army during the Meiji era, for instance, there were the Satsuma and Choshu domain cliques. As the army machine began to be concerned with complex policy issues under a rapidly changing international environment, each clique had to recruit men of ability, searching beyond the traditional clique boundaries.[9]

Post-retirement jobs do not in all cases constitute advancement for senior officials, but it is one of their major concerns, (probably as great as advancement within the Ministry itself). When a senior official retires from the Ministry, its Secretariat will usually provide him with an appropriate post-retirement job. If he were asked to retire under pressure from above, and declined to do so, then the Secretariat would be very reluctant to provide him the best available job upon his eventual retirement. In 1976, for instance, when HAYASHI (at that time Chief of the Industrial Environment Bureau of MITI, recruited in 1947) refused to retire, the Secretariat asked instead another Bureau Chief, MORIGUCHI (Chief of Industrial Information Bureau of MITI, recruited in 1947) to retire, and MORIGUCHI complied. HAYASHI stayed on in the Ministry, attached to its Secretariat, but was given no specific post and his wages were reduced by half. Eventually MORIGUCHI assumed the post of Deputy President of Daiei (Ranking No. 1 in the service industry), whereas HAYASHI took up the post of Deputy President of Jasco (Ranking No. 4 in the service industry). The above case indicates nonetheless the psychic insecurity: the high-ranking officials who reach a position such as that of Vice-Minister or Bureau Chief while still in their early fifties have to search for post-retirement jobs outside the bureaucracy.[10]

If one compares the employment situation of the retired 'Nationalists' and 'Internationalists' of MITI, the latter clearly have done better. In the case of 'S', probably, by reason of his right-hand man's sudden death and his own uncompromising personality, he could not secure an appropriate post-retirement job, and therefore he set up the Sahashi

Economic Research Institute by himself. He then took up the directorship of an obscure organization called the Japan Leisure Centre. Since some of the senior 'Nationalists' occupy posts in certain few steel firms—such as TOKUNAGA (Deputy President of Japan Steel Corporation) and MATSUO (Chairman of Nippon Kokan K. K.), 'C' found a position in Kawasaki steel corporation as its Deputy President, and 'Y' in Nippon Kokan K. K. as its Managing Director. The rest of the 'Nationalists' were resigned to taking up secondary posts although in quite good companies. The retired Vice-Ministers of the 'Internationalists' are dispersed into a number of industries. For instance, 'S' 's chief rival 'I' occupies the post of President of Nippon Oil Chemical Company. To follow the rest in succession order, 'M' is Deputy President of Toyota Motor Company; 'Z' who changed his loyalty later to the 'Internationalists' is President of the Electricity Development Corporation (this is one of the two public corporations attached to MITI); 'J' is President of Arabian Oil Company; YAMASHITA is Managing Director of Mitsui Company; KOMATSU is Managing Director of Kobe Steel Company; and WADA is adviser to the Industrial Bank of Japan. (Being adviser to one of the leading Japanese banks is one of the stopgap posts, since higher-level officials are not permitted to assume post-retirement jobs in private companies within two years after retirement. WADA took up the position of his predecessor, KOMATSU, who was until recently adviser to this bank.)

The pattern of recruitment, advancement and post-retirement jobs described above thus provides abundant evidence of clientelist behaviour. Exploiting such institutional resources as the formal functions of the Secretariat, the clientelist group can chart out a pattern to the advantage of its members. Such a pattern is not, however, immune to the danger of destruction by unexpected factors as is shown in 'S' 's case.

In the Soviet party-state bureaucracy patterns of recruitment and advancement have been far less routinized than in the Japanese case. Nonetheless, certain tendencies of routinization have been observable at all periods, albeit changing with changes in the top leadership regime.

As to recruitment, to take an example on a regional (*obkom*) level, two types of criteria seem to operate in the recruitment of its first secretary. First, recruitment of a regional first secretary may be influenced by the candidate's practical-administrative background, according to the requirements of a particular region. The reassignment of a regional secretary to a comparable policy position may operate not only on a lateral level, i.e. from region to region, but also vertically, i. e. from region to centre.[11] In the case of lateral reassignment, the transfers sometimes seem to make for purposes of troubleshooting, i. e. a more experienced secretary is sent from a more developed region to strengthen the leadership of a less developed region that may be in serious trouble economically.[12] A would-be first secretary might also be required to have experience in various types of work. According to some observers, men with both specialist and managerial experience, i. e. economically competent generalists, became, under the Brezhnev leadership, a more important consideration in promotions than either patronage or recent economic performance.[13] Secondly, there is the criterion of a formal succession of posts, e. g. under the Brezhnev regime, the majority of new first secretaries have been recruited from the 2nd secretaries of the *obkom* or the chairmen of the soviet executive committees of the same region,[14] whereas under the Khrushchev regime, many first secretaries were recruited from outside the region. By routinizing recruitment in this way, the Brezhnev regime may have indeed intended to maintain a delicate balance among contending groups. The application of such objective criteria may be intended to reduce the political element in such appointments, although it is by no means certain that it has succeeded in doing so.

As for patterns of advancement from the *obkom* first secretary position, again partial regularities are observable: a republican (except RSFSR) regional first secretary may be advanced to a republican party or government post. An Ukrainian regional first secretary may, however, be advanced to an Ukrainian party or government post, or, if he is fortunate, advanced directly to be a RSFSR regional first secretary

(although rare at present, this happened with several Khrushchev protégés in the 1950s). The first secretary of the Ukrainan or Belorussian party may be advanced directly to a higher party or government post at the centre. A RSFSR regional first secretary may have an opportunity to advance directly to a higher party or government post at the centre. It should be noted that there exists a hierarchy among the republics and among the regions,[15] of course a senior party post usually carries superior status to a senior government post on the same administrative level. Most advancements are those of sideslips like those in the Japanese government bureaucracy.

One could yet assume that promotion in the Soviet Union is determined not only by such objective criteria as performance, career background or seniority, but also by political consideration. There may exist career advancement by two kinds of political consideration.

The first kind may be indicative of the efforts shown by the post-Khrushchev oligarchs to establish legitimate rules for career advancement. To maintain a delicate balance of power, indeed, the Brezhnev regime needs to distribute rewards, such as promotions, in some relationship to the strength of groups within the ruling coalitions.[16] Moreover, the Brezhnev regime may have been careful not to unnecessarily antagonize those who had lost in the inter-group struggles. We learn from Willerton's analysis that about 47 per cent of the clients of demoted patrons have retained their Central Committee membership.[17] A number of clients of demoted patrons have thus been compensated with appointments and opportunities. In the early Brezhnev-Kosygin period, Brezhnev may have wanted to establish what Carl Landé terms a 'personal alliance system'. Landé distinguishes between 'traditional' dyadic relationships with vertical links and 'modern' relationships with horizontal links. In the latter relationships, the central individual has status, resources, or power roughly equal to those of his several partners.[18] The Brezhnev regime may be better characterised as a coalition of several complex vertical dyadic alliances. The findings presented by Joel Moses indicate, however, that Brezhnev had indeed

cultivated former relationships as well, i. e. fostered political advancement by patronage. Joel Moses claims that about 75 per cent of Dnepropetrovsk 'cohorts' (Brezhnev's) as against only about 18 per cent of the L'vov and Khar'kov 'cohorts' (Podgorny's) have been able to advance beyond the Ukraine to receive career assignments in other republics or at federal level.[19] John Willerton also observed a positve pattern between the advancements of Brezhnev and his clients.[20] In other words, the advancement of Brezhnev's clients, particularly since 1964, has not been constrained so much by the aforementioned objective criteria.

The crucial question here is, who is to determine and recommend the advancement of officials. A key to the building of a power base in the Soviet Union may still be to have control over the personnel selection. At one time, Podgorny was able to place his Kharkov subordinate, V. N. Titov, as the junior Central Committee secretary in charge of organizational party work (equivalent to the Director of the Secretariat in the Japanese government bureaucracy) and also another Kharkov subordinate, N. A. Sobol as second secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee (the secretary in charge of personnel selection in that republic). They were, however, removed from control over personnel selection before Podgorny could materialize his own power base through that channel. In the early post-Khrushchev period (1966), Brezhnev made a major advance by transferring his old second secretary in Zaporozhe (and his successor in Dnepropetrovsk), A. P. Kirilenko, to the responsibilities of general supervision over personnel selection and also of the urban economy that Podgorny had relinquished. Within the framework of routinized advancement, Brezhnev gradually succeeded in moving his protégés from Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe and Moldavia into key political posts.[21] Indeed, the growing influence of Brezhnev by 1973 which is reflected in the doubling of Dnepropetrovsk 'cohorts' can be explained either, as noted above, by their common career association with a single major political patron (Brezhnev) or, as Joel Moses suggests, with a plurality of patrons (assuming a coope-

rative arrangement between Brezhnev, Kirilenko and Shcherbitsky in the Politburo).[23] Such a cooperative arrangement, like that of the Vice-Minister and the Director of the Secretariat in the Japanese Ministries, would be a key to establishing such a group's power base.

In the Soviet Union, whether it is due to a temporary or a permanent 'personal alliance system' in Brezhnev style, other Politburo members than the Secretary-General and party Central Committee secretaries appear to bring pressure for the selection of personnel from their territorial or policy domains. Jerry Hough points out, for instance, that officials from Belorussian (Mazurov's region), from Leningrad (Kosygin's region), and from Kharkov (Podgorny's region) have been much more successful than the average. The same is true of the top foreign policy officials (an area with which Suslov has been involved, and the top industrial and construction officials (the area of responsibility both of Kosygin as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and of Brezhnev as the Central Committee secretary for industry from 1956 to the summer of 1960).[24]

Even under Stalin's reign, a second line of patrons seems to have enjoyed a certain latitude in the selection of lower political posts. N. S. Patolichev's recent memoirs reveal that his success and failure in career advancement was due in large part to the relative political power of his patron, Politburo member A. A. Andreyev. If Patolichev is to be believed, he owed his primary allegiance to Andreyev' rather than to Stalin, although the latter exercised ultimate authority over his career advancement. Even at Patolichev's level, he was allowed to recruit his own adherents as his subordinates.[25] In the Soviet Union, the promotion of an official appears to be basically determined or recommended by his immediate superior, which would obviously invite the flourishing of vertical relationships.

2) Policy. We have observed earlier that clientelism in the Japanese government bureaucracy linked with every aspect of the policy process. For instance, we saw that at a critical point 'S' brought his most able clients into the key positions in his office (Chief of the Enterprise

Bureau). In the Japanese government bureaucracy, it is usually the Vice-Minister or even more so, a Bureau Chief who launches policy initiatives leading to a new law or regulation with political ramifications and implications for the work of other Ministries. The Japanese government bureaucracy, which is by and large a line organization, is characterised by work-group solidarity within the 'frame', to use Chie Nakane's term. This office solidarity often renders cooperation difficult not only between Ministries, but also between Bureaus and Sections within a Ministry. To overcome such difficulties, there exist at least two institutional tools for arriving at a consensus. *Ringi-sei*, which is the process of obtaining consensus by circulating a draft plan within the Ministry concerned, is a formal internal consensus formation process.[26] Another institutional tool is an advisory committee drawn from business circles, academics, parliamentarians, and retired bureaucrats. Such a committee provides the Ministry with a forum well-suited for preliminary consultation prior to formal Ministerial or inter-Ministerial meetings. There is a high probability of obtaining a preliminary consensus among the interested parties in this carefully manipulated setting.[27] Policy-makers can also use this forum to legitimize their draft bill.[28] The advisory committee system is a formal process for obtaining an external consensus. In addition, however, at some point the draft must be cleared with the appropriate division of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Affair Research Council, and also at a meeting of the Vice-Minister and Bureau Chiefs of the Ministry concerned, or a meeting of the Vice-Ministers of all of the Ministries. To avoid open confrontation, the policy-makers in the bureaucracy usually engage in extensive informal consultations, mobilizing for this purpose their personal cliques and social networks, a process which overlaps with the aforementioned two formal consultation processes. Nevertheless, there are occasions in which an open confrontation does surface, providing a way, at least for one party, to gather together backing for a measure or a counter-measure. A recent example occurred with the plan by former Prime Minister FUKUDA

to set up a new Ministry of Energy Resources; the validity of this was openly challenged by the then Vice-Minister of MITI, WADA, who was in fear of losing administrative control over energy resource matters. Twenty days after this premeditated challenge, Prime Minister FUKUDA admitted that it was still premature to carry out his plan. During these twenty days, the whole resources of the Ministry had been mobilized to deal with the danger.[29] First of all, the Bureau Chiefs met to discuss a strategy for countering FUKUDA's plan. Then, WADA personally approached the then Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Finance, KICHISE, for assistance; in view of the large financial implications of setting up a new Ministry, Ministry of Finance approval would obviously be acquired. KICHISE had been a contemporary of WADA in the accounting section of the old Japanese Imperial Navy, and the two may well have kept alive ever since a loose horizontal dyadic alliance, in which one could count on the other's help in time of need.[30] The Director and the section chiefs of the Secretariat, all trusted clients of WADA, played an active part in influencing the interested parties. At first, they appealed to other Ministries which were affected by FUKUDA's other administrative reform plans, to concert their efforts to counter these plans. Secondly, they approached the former Ministers of MITI, in particular, MIKI and NAKASONE, now leaders of counter-mainstream factions in the Liberal Democratic Party. And, finally, they appealed to industrial and commercial circles either directly or through social networks such as school ties and family relations not to support FUKUDA's plan. The final outcome was a victory for WADA, who stayed on as Vice-Minister of MITI until his natural retirement from the office.

Students of Soviet politics are divided on the question whether clientelism in the Soviet Union is closely related to the politics of the policy process. Jerry Hough, for example, appears to believe that Soviet factional activity is concerned almost entirely with the acquisition of position and has relatively little policy content.[41] First of all, he asserts, anti-faction rule makes the formation of any substantial

network of alliances along philosophical lines among regional and other middle-level officials difficult. Secondly, these middle-level political officials refrain, in order to avoid damaging their political chances, from policy controversy or even a policy stance. And, thirdly, the nature of censorship strengthens the tendency for policy relevant alliances to remain compartmentalised within specialized 'whirlpools' with selective censorship making it difficult to appeal through the press for outside allies.[32] Jerry Hough's negative estimate of the factional element in the policy process thus appears to be based on a view of middle-level officials as structurally and ideologically restricted in their bahaviour. Joel Moses, on the other hand, points to the fact that Dnepropetrovsk 'cohorts' have assumed a very wide range of policy responsibility and authority in such diverse institutions as the Ukrainian, Russian, and All-Union Council of Ministers, the Komsomol, economic planning organs, political publishing houses, trade union councils, heavy industry and consumer sector ministries, the foreign ministry including the diplomatic corps, and the secret police.[33] Moses appears to assume, therefore, that the influence of a major political patron probably depends in some measure on his ability to mobilize as wide a base of political support as possible for his policy initiatives in the Soviet bureaucracies. If the Soviet Union has moved toward the model of 'institutional pluralism' as Jerry Hough claims it has,[34] it is imperative, on the part of a major patron, to protect his policy initiatives and his own political position by placing as many loyal subordinates as possible in a wide range of functional and political key positions.

Although we do not have direct evidence of a faction-dominated policy process, it seems reasonable to assume that factional activity connected with efforts to establish a dominant position within the ruling oligarchy, inevitably takes on policy content. Khrushchev's Party bifurcation plan in 1962, for example, was ostensibly designed to promote cadres with skills in technical and economic works. Armstrong considers, however, that the party bifurcation was directed against the agricultural regional first secretaries.[35] Another example mentioned

by Carl Linden was Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign, which he used more than once to regain the offensive whenever he lost ground — as a means of keeping critics off balance, and to define the terms of political battle in his favour;[37] in the process of the anti-Stalinist campaign, moreover, Khrushchev needed the support of the Leningrad party organization against the 'group', but in return, the Leningraders exacted a price for their aid in terms of expanded influence in the leadership.[38]

In the process of policy implementation, clientage 'networks' may give play to the initiating power of the patron. Robert Miller points out that the Brezhnev regime has tried a number of territorially and functionally limited agricultural integration experiments, allowing local party officials considerable latitude in devising models tailored to local circumstances.[39] His closer analysis of aglicultural integration in the USSR shows that the most radical and comprehensive experiments have been carried on in Moldavia by Brezhnev's protégé I. I. Bodiul. It appears, in this case, that one of Brezhnev's active clients, Bodiul, rendered strong commitment in the search for strategies of policy implementation, whereas Bodiul's patron, Brezhnev, protected Bodiul and his own position by silencing criticisms of the radical Moldavian approach to agricultural reorganization.[40]

The above evidence, albeit fragmented, shows that power politics among contending leaders certainly may take on policy content. Clientelist activity in this regard, however, takes varying approachs depending on the political circumstances of particular time, or the nature of particular regime, and or the kind of policy content.

Non-functional Motivation

N. S. Patolichev is said to have had affective personal ties with A. A. Andreyev, Central Committee secretary under Stalin.[41] As yet, however, there appear to be no serious studies of cultural factors which may impart an affective aspect to Soviet clientelist relations. A few students of Soviet politics who have studied Soviet clientelism

are inclined to link clientelism exclusively or predominantly to institutional, social and situational causation.[42]

In Japan, it is almost taken for granted that subordinates are tied personally, emotively and particularistically to the leader.[43] Chie Nakane asserts that a group in which members are positioned hierarchically in a rigid pyramid operate within a common 'frame', which may be a locality, an institution or a particular relationship that binds a set of individuals into one group. The institutional frame fulfils the important function of keeping the members together, whatever factions are found within it, and since members are classified primarily by the institution, whatever internal rivalries they may feel, they realize that they are all in one boat racing with another boat.[44] Takeshi Ishida also asserts that a strong sense of identity with the organization and conformity to its goals is accompanied by a sense of competition both externally with other organizations and internally in loyalty to their own organization. The orientation of the members is not toward individual achievement but toward merit acquired by individual contribution to the goal of the organization. In this case, 'conformity' and 'competition' were not mutually opposed but rather mutually reinforcing.[45] If we take such assertions (which still need to be tested empirically) at face value, there seem to exist two kinds of loyalty: one to the organization and the other to the patron. However, the two kinds of loyalty appear to overlap one another, since clientelist activities are tied in with policy content within the organization. There may well be an occasion, nonetheless, when a client values the integrity of the organization more than his status and gains within a clientelist group. He will thus limit informal group participation, or modify it so that it does not interfere with his formal position, or go over to another clientelist group whose objects are closer to the goal of the organization, as we saw in 'Z' 's case. Such behaviour is, however, extremely difficult to carry through. The relationship between the patron and the client involves a mutual psychological or emotional dependence. The relationship binds not only the client; it also binds

the leader who, though he may often appear to be able to exercise a great deal of power, finds his authority checked and controlled at a great many points.[46] The members of the clientelist group may share egalitarian sentiments, despite the fact that there exists official ranking and informal status within the group. Without such sentiments, there would not exist a feeling of shame or a sense of guilt for not returning favours to one's patron or one's clients. A noted Japanese psychologist, Takeo Doi, has conceptualized this notion as 'active dependency'.[47] The Japanese, generally speaking, appear to be attached very strongly to abstract mores regarding the exchange of favours.[48] The importance of reciprocating gratifications is internalized in the course of socialization process of the individual, so that he feels morally obliged to give benefits to those from whom he has received them. The important point is 'the norm of reciprocity', as Alvin Gouldner terms it,[49] internalized not only by those in weaker positions but also by those who have the power to take, without giving anything in return. The relationship between the patron and the client is, indeed, emotionally and psychologically one of mutual dependence. Such a relationship is reinforced structurally in Japanese organizations. The actual role of an individual in the organization does not always or necessarily correspond to his rank or status assigned formally by the organization.[50] When the group is in action the roles of individual members are readily adjustable to changing situations: such as we saw in the relationship between the Vice-Minister and the Director of Secretariat, or between the Director and the section chiefs of the Secretariat. The lack of clear role differentiation in the organization makes it easier for subordinates to reciprocate favours on an equal footing, given the fact a subordinate often de facto carries out the work of his immediate superior, and so nurtures the clientelist formation. On the other hand, this offers the subordinate an opportunity to manoeuvre against his competing colleagues.

2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE CLIENTELIST GROUP

Chie Nakane notes also that the *oyabun-kobun* (patron-client) relationship comes into being through one's occupational training and acitivities, and carries social and personal implications, appearing symbolically at the critical moments in a man's life.[51] She goes on to say, however, that the informal hierarchy and the factions which develop among a group's members (the invisible organization) overlap and supersede an institution's formal administrative (visible) organization.[52] Although this vertically-organized structure could well be 'starting mechanism',[53] through which individuals can initiate social interaction and develops into vertical dyadic alliances. As we observed already, the informal hierarchy does not fully correspond with the formal organizational hierarchy.

There exist two kinds of informal group members: one consists of 'inner frame' members who are still in active service in the Ministry, and the other of 'outer frame' members who are either retired officials taking up positions in a cluster of 'colonies' or 'satelites' such as public corporations, or official clients of the Ministry such as private enterprises. Clientelism in the Japanese government bureaucracy, by and large, is formed gradually, as officials search for reliable and able (as the groups' activities are strongly oriented to policy contents) subordinates in the process of the spiral promotion of the patron himself. Its members are thus made up of persons from a number of bureaus and sections. The reciprocating process in the Japanese system is a life-long process, even though, upon the retirement of the patron from the office, the roles of patron and client are reversed. The new patron who can command better resources and have access to the political processes is now in a position to return the favours he received from his original patron. If, for example, the latter now heads a public corporation, larger subsidies from the Ministry mean an increase in his corporation's sphere of influence, or at least in its prestige. Although dyadic relationships are a life-long process, the

structure of power relations in the informal group headed by the new patron may not be quite the same as that of the group headed by the original patron. With the demise of the latter, no matter which one in the group succeeds, the group cannot maintain the same structure of membership with the new leader who has his own clients who are tied particularlistically to himself. The duration of the clientelist relationship is, strictly speaking, of only one generation: the working life of the patron. Stability of clientelist groups will also be affected by external factors such as changes in the structure of political leadership.

In the Soviet Union, factors such as insecurity and unpredictability of tenure, acquisition of power and, to a lesser extent, the policy process appear to contribute to clientelism. Many of the clientelist bonds in the Soviet political system are largely formed during the patron's mid-career period, most likely around regional and republican secretaries. Joel Moses has presented evidence of a direct linkage between the political influence of a central patron and local 'cohorts'.[54] As the avenues for career advancement at regional level have become institutionalized, albeit its future is not absolutely certain, it is certainly arguable now whether the regional first secretaries (mainly in the RSFSR) who link the higher levels with the lower ones may be inspired to form clientage networks in his own region. The inspiration may naturally vary depending on the personal motivations and ambitions of the individual regional first secretaries. Apart from the political advantages a regional first secretary has as being a regional boss, one should also note the peculiar institutional set-up within the Soviet political system. That is the lack of clear role differentiation between various organizations in each level: in particular, the overlapping system of party and government officials, together with the system of other controlling agencies. This bears some resemblance to the unclear role differentiation we have discussed in the Japanese government bureaucracy, although the latter relates to vertical role differentiation, whereas the former relates to lateral role differentiation.

Such an institutional set-up may encourage a regional first secretary to assume the role of patron. The regional first secretaries, furthermore, may under certain circumstances establish horizontal alliances among the regional secretaries themselves, most likely in the form of alliances among the regional secretaries who share the same major patron (e. g. a senior Politburo member). Here, they are likely to alternate in roles of patron and client depending upon the situation in which the exchanges take place, despite the fact that there exists a hierarcy among the region.[55] The aggregate of clientage links, therefore, might give a regional first secretary a resource, as does his access to a senior Politburo member.

However, it should be noted, first, that the above descriptions are static views of clientage networks formed around regional party secretaries. The patron-client relationship would develop and grow over time, as both individuals rise in the hierarchy.[56] This time factor would greatly contribute, unless the patron himself were demoted in the meantime, to the formation of complex vertical dyadic alliances and even coalitions of alliances. Secondly, although the groupings arise out of regional variations, its members, as the patron advances up the hierarchical ladder, will be dispersed into diverse institutions cutting right across regional and organizational boundaries. As we noted earlier, the wider its members are dispersed, the better the clientelist group may work as a policy support system.

The fate of the vertical dyadic alliances will largely be determined by the rise and fall of the major patron. The way the patronage network is to maintain or to expand its membership varies according to the character of the regime, as we observed earlier in comparing the Brezhnev and Khrushchev regimes. Nevertheless, if the major patron were the General Secretary, he would be in a far better position to initiate broad political programmes directly or indirectly for the well-being of his protégés than his associates in the Politburo, who are largely limited to counteractions. If the other associates in the Politburo perceived a threat both to their own career and to the stability

of origarchic rule, they might attempt to topple the General Secretary, as happened to Khrushchev twice during his reign. Power relations of the vertical dyadic alliances under a new major patron will in most cases differ from those of the former alliances, as do those in the Japanese government bureaucracy. Moreover, if the current policy of 'stability of cadres' continued, a new major patron might find even more difficult to break up other rival patrons' regional 'networks'.

3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In Japan, personal cliques are generally regarded as social evil. In the Soviet Union, likewise, factionalism is much discussed as running counter to the ideological interest.

Albert Craig, however, recognizes the positive functions of bureaucratic cliques in Japanese government bureaucracy as follows:

> One is to bypass an occasional blockage up-and-down the organization by forming a conduit for communications outside of channels. Another important function is lateral communication with a high level of trust. The coordination of work on a horizontal axis is often difficult within Japanese bureaucracy since vertical ties are so important that they always take precendence. But if the chief of one bureau was formerly the section chief in another bureau, he may well know its present section chief and will certainly know some of its permanent lower officials. This may enable him to reach them directly without going through the other bureau chief, especially if he is close to the present chief. His effectiveness as a bureaucrat depends in some measure on the cultivation of such personal ties.... Personal cliques are limited to the confines of a single ministry since officials are not transferred from one ministry to anothr. Consequently personal cliques are of no use in coordinating work between ministries... If an acquaintance from the same class at Tokyo University is in another ministry, a short telephone call may accomplish what would take days or weeks.... In a variety of ways, the informal system within the bureaucracy complements and is necessary to the formal system.[57]

Thus, Craig attaches a particular importance to the communication function of clientelism within the Ministry and with other Ministries in the course of policy-making and policy implementation. We have also observed that its career mobility function goes beyond the boundaries of the government bureaucracy. Through clientage networks, interests may be aggregated and articulated at different levels. One of the singularities of Japanese clientage is that its activities are so closely related to every aspect of the policy process. If one focuses on each aspect of clientage separately, one misses its dynamic element, that is, that patron-client networks expand the bureaucracy's capacity in policy innovation, hence enhance the Bureaucracy's adaptability to its changing environment. Rapid turnover of office holders and routinization of recruitment and advancement are very much in gear with the positive functions of the political clientage. By imparting to the Secretariat (in charge of personnel and organizational matters) such a crucial role in each Ministry, political clientage in the government bureaucracy is not only tolerated but also structurally maintained to perform its positive functions which are hidden under the formal institutional set-up.

In the Soviet Union, as indicated in the preceding sections, the participants in the chain of clientelist relationships appeared to treat political clientage as one of several possible alternatives to further career perspectives and to acquire political power. Clientage networks may also be mobilized for support of the patron at a critical moment such as a succession crisis. It is not clear, however, whether the clientelist activities are closely related, as those of Japanese clientage constantly are, to the policy process.[58] We have noted earlier, however, that vertical dyadic alliances are operating in every level of the entire Soviet political system. It would not be altogether impossible to assume that Brezhnev's 'cohorts', for instance, might lend their support to their patron's policy initiatives. In the course of policy implementation, they might be more likely to cooperate with one another for the fulfilment of individual targets as suggested in relation to the

regional first secretaries and as observed in the agricultural integration experiment in Moldavia.

Trends have been observed in the past similar to those found in the Japanese government bureaucracy, namely, to recruit competent generalists rather than specialists, to routinize advancement, to keep policy relevant alliances compartmentalized within specialized 'whirlpools', to use Jerry Hough's apt metaphor, (though, in the Japanese government bureaucracy, this occurs in the offices of lower-level officials more than in those of higher-level officials), and also to maintain unclear role differentiation. Despite such similar trends, the main areas of Soviet clientelist activities, judging by the available evidence, are centred on the pursuance of group members' career perspectives and the acquisition of power. We have observed that the causation of clientelism operating within the Japanese government bureaucracy and within the Soviet political system at large appears to be closely linked with political and functional motivations along with cultural factors. Yet, historically one of the strongest factors in the Soviet system contributing to a clientelist formation is evidently insecurity and unpredictability of tenure, whereas in Japan this factor appears to be lacking but on the other hand clientelism appears to be grounded in the culturally deep-rooted particularistic behaviour of individuals. This difference in the origins of political clientelism might be expected to have consequences for its functions in the two countries. For the moment, however, as long as certain elements such as the length of service required for advancement in each level and the timing of retirement from office remains less formalized, the clientage networks may not be able to express their functions fully in the area of the policy process. Such a state of political clientage in the Soviet Union may indeed become an element of destabilization in the power structure of leadership, by offsetting its positive functions.

From this analysis, we can conclude that political clientage, while manifesting substantial differences in Japan and the USSR, nevertheless operates as a systemic adjusting mechanism in both countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Ministry's employees union is a part of the Public Service Employees Union, and is composed of only lower-level officials. Although 'S', as a union leader, was opposed to the then government's policy of curtailment of administrative manpower, he formed the Committee for the Dismissal of Inefficient Officials. Through this Committee, the union selected inefficient officials who were to resign voluntarily, and in turn the union provided them with alternative jobs within or outside the Ministry. He also succeeded in setting up criteria of incompetency for higher-level officials, who as a rule did not become members of the union. Some higher officials were quite annoyed at him, yet could not disregard him because he was backed by the union. In order to minimise 'S' 's pressure, the Ministry created a new section of labour in the General Affairs Bureau which was headed by 'S'. The latter was then placed in a position to mediate the interests of the Ministry and the union.
2. When 'S' was Chief of the Heavy Industry Brueau, he received favours from the Ohno faction - the Minister, FUKUDA, being a member of this faction - in connection with the appropriation of the budget; 'S' did not, however, return these favours by having his Bureau take action in the interests of the faction. See K. Hayashihara, *Uchimaku-Tsusansho*, Tokyo, Yell Books, 1976, pp. 97-98.
3. See. Y. Honda, *Nihon Neo-Kanryoron*, Tokyo, Kodansha, 1974, p. 28.
4. The main sources for this case are as follows: S. Shiroyama, *Kanryo-Tachi no Natsu*, Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1975; Hayashihara, *Uchimaku*; T. Kusayanagi, 'Tsusansho', in *Bungei Shun Jyu*, vol. 52, no. 9, (1974), pp. 110-126; Honda, *Nihon Neo-Kanryoron*, and 'Tsusan Kanryo no Seitai', in *Zaikai Tenbo*, vol. 22, no. 8, (1978), pp. 62-138.
5. See Carl H. Landé, 'The dyadic basis of clientelism', in *Friends, Followers, and Factions*, Steffen W. Schmidt, *et al.* (eds.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p. xx.
6. Keith R. Legg, 'Clientelism and Advanced Industrial societies', in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 12, nos. 2 & 3, (1979), p. 197.
7. By 'career officials' I mean those higher-level officials, who have passed a special higher examination. The characteristics of the career

officials and lower-level officials can be distinguished roughly on the basis of whether they are generalists or specialists, technicians, or clerks, and whether they have relative freedom for creative work or solely perform mechanical and routine tasks, and whether they have the satisfaction of having power or the frustrations accompanying routine tasks. Albert T. Craig asserts that the office in which the lower-level officials work together and the degree to which their career mobilities are limited is below the level of cliques. See Albert T. Craig, 'Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', in *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making*, Ezra F. Vogel (ed.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, p. 17. To see how the Japanese bureaucrats are comparable with their Soviet counterparts, this paper examines only the higher-level officials whose bureaucratic behaviour is governed by laws, customs, and politics.

8. See H. Sakakibara, *Nihon o enshutsusuru Shinkanryozo*, Tokyo, Yamato Shobo, 1977, pp. 56-58.
9. See H. Nishimura, *Showa Rikugun Habatsu Kososhi*, Tokyo, Dento to Gendaisha, 1975, pp. 44-45.
10. See B. Kanayama, 'Kanryodo no Kenkyu', in *Chuo-Koron*, no. 7, (1978), p. 243.
11. See Joel C. Moses, 'Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk', in *Soviet Union*, vol. 3, pt. 1, (1976), p. 79.
12. Philip D. Stewart, *et al.*, 'Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A partial test of two models', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 66, (1972), p. 1280.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 1279.
14. See T.H. Rigby, 'The Soviet regional leadership: The Brezhnev generation', in *Slavic Review*, vol. 37, no. 1, (1978), pp. 1-24.
15. See Peter Frank, 'Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees', in *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 4, pt. 2, (1974), pp. 217-230; and Mary McAuly, 'The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee', in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4, (1974), pp. 473-501.
16. See Stewart, *et al.*, 'Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process', p. 1279.

17. See John P. Willerton, Jr., 'Clientelism in the Soviet Union', in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 12, nos. 2 & 3, (1979), p. 80.
18. Carl H Landé, 'Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 67, no. 1, (1973), p. 105.
19. See Moses, 'Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR', p. 82.
20. See Willerton, 'Clientelism in the Soviet Union', pp. 166-167. Jerry Hough has also stated that the officials from Belorussia (Mazurov's region), from Leningrad (Kosygin's region), from Kharkov (Podgorny's region), and of course from Dnepropetrovsk were much more successful than the average, especially if we correct for the higher age of the Kharkov officials. See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 540.
21. Hough, *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259.
22. Moses, 'Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR', p. 85.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
24. Hough, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, p. 540.
25. See N. S. Patolichev, *Ispytaniye na zrelost'*, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1977, reviewed by T.H. Rigby, 'How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered', in *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXIX, no. 2, (1980), pp. 57-63.
26. Albert Craig claims that the *Ringi* process is highly visible and peculiarly Japanese. A draft may be circulated for unimportant matters, but for significant matters, the primary function of the *Ringi* system is to circulate information about decisions already taken. See Craig, 'Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', p. 24.
27. See T.J. Pempel, 'The Bureaucratization of Policy-Making in Postwar Japan', in the *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. XVIII, no. 4, (1974), pp. 656-662.
28. Ehud Harrari, 'Japanese Politics of Advice in Comparative Perspective: A Framework for Analysis and a Case Study', in *Public Policy*, vol. XXII, no. 4, (1974), pp. 575-577.
29. See Hayashihara, *Uchimaku*, pp. 10-25.
30. See Landé, 'The dyadic basis of clientelism', pp. xiv-xv.

31. See Hough, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, p. 541.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 540-543.
33. See Moses, 'Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR', p. 78.
34. See Hough, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, p. 526.
35. John A. Armstrong, 'Party Bifurcation and Elite Interest', in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2, (1966), pp. 417-430.
36. Carl Linden, 'Kurushchev and Party Rules', in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 12, no. 5, (1963), p. 32.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
38. Carl Linden, 'How Strong is Khrushchev? - II' in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 12, no. 6, (1963), p. 58.
39. See Robert F. Miller, 'The Politics of Policy Implementation in the USSR: Soviet Policies on Agricultural Integration Under Brezhnev', in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2, (1980), p. 191.
40. See also the case of demoted Estonian leader, Johannes I. Kebin in Miller, *Ibid.* pp. 183-184.
41. See Rigby's review of Patolichev's book, 'How the Obkom Secretary was Tempered', p. 60.
42. See Stewart, *et al.*, 'Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process', p. 1270; T.H. Rigby in Willerton's article, 'Clientelism in the Soviet Union', pp. 161-162; and Zygmunt Bauman, 'Eastern Europe', in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 12, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 184-189.
43. H. Fukui, 'Factionalism in a Dominant Party System', delivered at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, (1974), p. 3.
44. Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, pp. 57-58.
45. Takeshi Ishida, *Japanese Society*, London, Random House, 1974, pp. 37-40.
46. Nakane, *Japanese Society*, p. 66.
47. L. T. Doi, 'Amae - A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure', in *Japanese Culture: Its Development and Characteristics*, R.J. Smith and R.K. Beardsley (eds.), Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1962; and L.T. Doi, 'Giri-Ninjo: An Interpretation', in *Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan*, R.P. Dore (ed.), Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967.
48. See NHK survey data, 1973 and 1978, *Gendai Nihonjin no Ishikozo*,

Tokyo, NHK Books, no. 344, 1979, pp. 206-208.

49. See Alvin W. Gouldner, 'The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement', in Schmidt, *et al.* (eds.), *Friends, Followers and Factions*, pp. 28-43.
50. See Nakane, *Japanese Society*, p. 81.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
53. See Gouldner, ' The Norm of Reciprocity', p. 39.
54. This linkage is substantiated by the post-1964 decline of Kharkov (Podgorny) cohorts ralative to the increasing career advantage collectively enjoyed by former Dnepropetrovsk (Brezhnev) cohorts. See Moses, 'Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR', p. 87.
55. This interchangeable roles of patron and client are said to be practised at societal level in Communist countries. See Zygmunt Bauman, 'Eastern Europe', p. 186. One could possibly call this a part of 'network' rather than a patron-client dyad.
56. See Willerton, 'Clientelism in the Soviet Union', p. 163.
57. See Craig, 'Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', pp. 14-15.
58. Uri Ra'anan argues that Soviet factions display little long-term commitment to issues. They are inclined to advocate certain policies only as long as they are competing with rival groups that propagate a different approach. Once such competitors are defeated finally and unmistakably, manipulation of the issue in question loses political significance. See Uri Ra'anan, 'Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations', in *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXIX, no. 6, (1980), pp. 41-47.